China’s Arsenal of Extraterritorial Legislation: “Unity” as the Upgraded Metal Armor

China’s new “Ethnic Unity and Progress Law” calls for extraterritorial jurisdiction under the guise of the protective principle, raising concerns that China will use the legislation as a defensible mean to engage in transnational repression and coercive assimilation.

[1]

On March 12, 2026, Chinese President Xi Jinping (“Xi”) and the People’s Republic of China (“the P.R.C.”) promulgated the Ethnic Unity and Progress Law (“Act”) which took effect July 1, 2026.[2] The National People’s Congress (“NPC”), China’s legislative body, claimed to have enacted the Act to “promote ethnic unity and progress."[3] In reality, the Act is just another addition to China’s growing arsenal of extraterritorial legislation, through which Beijing seeks to justify its otherwise unlawful physical expansion under the guise of “security concerns.”[4] 

By framing such measures as a necessary response against looming security threats, China seeks to justify Article 63—and by extension the entire Act—under the “protective principle,”[5] a recognized basis for exercising prescriptive jurisdiction abroad.[6] If the United States and the EU—which has committed itself to “the strict observance of international law”[7]—continue to leave China unchecked, the Act’s wide discretion will embolden other autocratic regimes to enact similar assimilating policies under the protective principle, giving them a legal basis to equate “national security with regime security” at the expense of democracy worldwide.[8]

Article 63 of the Act states that “[o]rganizations and individuals outside the [mainland] territory of the P.R.C. that commit acts aimed at the P.R.C. that undermine ethnic unity and progress or create ethnic division are to be pursued for legal responsibility in accordance with law.”[9] Because of the ambiguous language describing punishable conduct and China’s subjective standard for evaluating threats, any opposition to the regime is now subject to China’s jurisdiction.[10]

Legal Supply Chain: "Sourcing"

China sources its extraterritorial legislation from two forms of jurisdiction; (1) prescriptive jurisdiction and (2) enforcement jurisdiction. Prescriptive jurisdiction is the state’s ability to “make laws for persons, property, and conduct,” and apply it to conduct abroad.[11] Conversely, enforcement jurisdiction is the mechanism a state uses to enforce those laws abroad, naturally implicating the “power to coerce or punish violations.”[12] Via the dictates of the Act, China may try to exercise enforcement jurisdiction to punish any individual or organization that has since left the mainland. In effect, China could extend this practice to create a system of global censorship, silencing any form of dissidence far beyond its territorial borders.

However, S.S. Lotus—a landmark case of the Permanent Court of International Justice (“PCIJ”)—laid down hefty limitations on the bandwidth of enforcement jurisdiction under the scrutiny of international law.[13] In S.S. Lotus, the PCIJ held that a state “may not exercise its power in any form in the territory of another State . . . except by virtue of a permissive rule . . . .”[14] The Court clarified that “[i]t does not, however, follow that international law prohibits a State from exercising jurisdiction in its own territory, in respect of any case which relates to acts which have taken place abroad . . . .”[15] Thus, while China may have authority to prescribe the Act’s application to conduct occurring abroad, it may not enforce the Act without a host state’s consent.[16] 

Legal Supply Chain: “Packaging”

For China to even apply—that is, prescribe—the Act abroad, it must first have a proper justification for its exercise of prescriptive jurisdiction.[17] Thus, China attempts to "package” its exercise of prescriptive jurisdiction within the protective principle.  Evolving from the French Revolution, the protective principle is an exception to the traditional rule that a sovereign possesses the exclusive authority to enact and enforce laws within their territory, thereby preventing a state from exercising jurisdiction beyond its border.[18] The protective principle circumvents this traditional territorial conception, allowing a state to extend its jurisdiction to extraterritorial acts,[19] whenever conduct threatens the “state’s security or could interfere with its government’s essential functions.”[20] 

China fully believes the Act has a legitimate legal basis under the protective principle; accordingly, China’s State Council Information Office called the Act “legitimate, lawful, necessary, and workable legal provision.”[21] Utilizing this self-protection” logic, China has built what has become known as an entire legal system that is completely extraterritorial. [22] Seeking to internationally entrench its domestic interests, China applies the protective principle’s subjective standard for self-protection as widely as possible against anyone who contravenes the Act’s ambiguous provisions.[23] Without a condemnation of China’s misuse of the protective principle or an objective standard to evaluate its deployment, these abuses will continue to persist giving China a “vehicle to internationalize many of its domestic legal commitments.”[24]

.

Close-Range Targets: Ethnic Minorities

Since the start of this violent repression, China has sought to erase minority identity through the condemnation of any diverse ethnic belief, custom, or practice.[25] The Act continues China’s “decades-long shifts towards aggressive assimilationist policies,”[26] leaving Tibetans, Uyghurs, and Mongols particularly vulnerable to the regime’s objective to enforce a singular ethnic identity in all mainland provinces and prefectures.[27] Since 2017, China has detained more than one million Uyghurs and members of other ethnic minorities and relocated them to “re-education camps” in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region under the charge of “extremist and separatist behavior.”[28]  

The Act further substantiates China’s campaign of coercive assimilation through the creation of a “shared” national identity among the country’s fifty-six ethnic minority groups.[29] For example, the NPC—through Article 15—requires that the state’s common language, Mandarin, is concurrently provided whenever there is the use of a minority language.[30] This provision and many others raise serious concerns regarding restrictions on minorities’ right to language, cultural and religious beliefs, and freedom of assembly and association.[31] Subsequently, Article 63 now extends these concerns beyond China’s borders by claiming to hold any group or person “accountable” for conduct that “undermines ethnic unity and creates ethnic division.”[32] Since these terms are ambiguous as to what type of conduct may qualify as punishable, China could condemn all minority political speech or minority advocacy.[33] Under this construction, “unity” cannot be interpreted to mean the establishment of harmony between communities, but rather “conformity with Beijing’s political line.” [34] 

Furthermore, Article 63 may provide a legal basis[35] for China’s continued “sophisticated and comprehensive campaign of transnational repression.”[36] This is achieved when governments employ authoritarian tactics to silence nationals abroad in an effort to “control and subjugate its citizens.”[37] By extension, China likely views peaceful political and human rights advocacy as conduct that “undermines ethnic unity.”[38] This expansive interpretation may then expose minorities, and human rights defenders abroad to the regime’s coercive methods of transnational repression,[39] such as surveillance, intimidation, cyber operations, and pressure on family members.[40]  

Long-Range Targets: [Taiwanese] Sovereignty

Transnational repression also poses great challenges to a host state’s sovereignty;[41] the Act thus raises serious concerns for Taiwan.[42] Whenever China exerts and enforces its authority over foreign soil without the host state’s consent, it disrupts the host state’s internal governance and sovereignty in favor of China’s desired image.[43] These actions thus violate the well-respected prohibition on intervention. [44] 

The P.R.C. already carries a robust and unlawful “toolkit” for commanding China’s asserted authority over Taiwan, including the 2005-Anti Secession Laws, the 2015 National Security Law, and June 2025 guidelines.[45] China may now look to condemn Taiwan’s separatism under the Act as illegal “minority advocacy” that amounts to a “hostile act against the State.”[46] Since Article 21 of the Act explicitly states that its objective is to “enhance Taiwan compatriots’ sense of belonging, identification, and pride in the Chinese people,”[47] it is clear that China may use it as a tool to “prosecute and harass citizens abroad.”[48]  If enforced, it has the potential to undermine the sovereignty of other States, in addition to Taiwan. [49]

Call for International Disarmament

 While China may rely more on the deterring effects of the Act, there is still an ever-present risk of undue and unlawful enforcement jurisdiction that will require host states to step in and condemn the unlawful exercise of jurisdiction.[50] Under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”) Article 2(1), treaty members are obliged to oppose any enforcement action,[51] and the international community as a whole must remain committed to the principles of territorial sovereignty against any country that attempts to engage in transnational repression.[52] 

Furthermore, Article 11 of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (“ICERD”) provides a mechanism for a state to bring a suit against China in front of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (“CERD”)[53] Although, this mechanism has “yet to be raised in the context of potential international responses to alleged rights violations by the P.R.C. ,”[54] the CERD has previously emphasized Article 11, the inter-state complaint procedure,  in Palestine v. Israel, to highlight the power of  “collective enforcement” action by member nations.[55] To legitimize the continued enforcement power of international treaties, member states who proclaim they are bound by its mandates should turn towards this inter-state mechanism to prosecute China’s manifold of abuses, including the Act.

States should also pressure China to withdraw its signature from the ICCRP. As scholar Margaret Lewis argues in the Washington Post, calling on China to remove its signature would highlight its failure to uphold interim treaty obligations.[56] Formally renouncing China’s signatory status would expose the overall illusory nature of China’s international commitments[57] and send a larger message that the international community will no longer tolerate “egregious human rights.”[58] Lastly, removing China as a signatory nation will signify the international community’s continued commitment to universally protecting human rights.[59] This commitment necessitates reinforcement, especially at a time where states have continually failed to recognize and condemn genocide and human rights abuses occurring elsewhere.

---

[1] Ma Hongdao, Ni Fanghua, & Ding Yuguan, 我国是一个团结统一的多民族国家 [Our Country Is a United and Unified Multi-Cultural Nation] (1982), https://chineseposters.net/posters/e13-618. 

[2] Ethnic Unity and Progress Law, China L. Translate (Mar. 12, 2026), https://www.chinalawtranslate.com/en/ethnic-unity-and-progress-law/.

[3] Id.

[4] Alyssa Resar, Self-Protection in World Society: Reformulating the Protective Principle in International Law, 134 Yale L.J. 1824, 1846 (2025); China: Escalation of transnational repression against Taiwan must end, Article 19 (Nov. 18, 2025), https://www.article19.org/resources/china-escalation-of-transnational-repression-against-taiwan-must-end/.

[5] Yu-Chen Cheng, China’s Law on Promoting Ethnic Unity and Progress and Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, OpinioJuris (July 22, 2026), https://opiniojuris.org/2026/07/22/chinas-law-on-promoting-ethnic-unity-and-progress-and-extraterritorial-jurisdiction/;

[6] William S. Dodge, Reasonableness in the Restatement (Fourth) of Foreign Relations Law, 55 Willamette L. Rev. 521, 527 (2019). 

[7] European Union, Aims and Values, https://european-union.europa.eu/principles-countries-history/principles-and-values/aims-and-values_en (last visited Nov. 1, 2026).

[8] Resar, supra note 4, at 1840.

[9] Ethnic Unity and Progress Law, supra note 2.

[10] Cheng, supra note 5; Resar, supra note 4, at 1854.

[11] Id.

[12] Thi Thu Phuong Tran, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: From Theory to International Practices and the Case of Vietnam Law, 13 J. Pol. & L. 151, 152 (2020).

[13] Ruwanthika Gunarante, 6.1 Prescriptive and Enforcement Jurisdiction: Territorial and Extraterritorial Application, Word Press: Pub. Int’l L. (Apr. 28, 2013), https://ruwanthikagunaratne.wordpress.com/2011/04/13/jurisdiction/.

[14] S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), Judgment, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. E) No. 9, ¶ 45 (Sep. 7). 

[15] Id. ¶ 46 (emphasis added).

[16] Gunarante, supra note 13.

[17] Tran, supra note 12, at 151.

[18] Arthur Lenhoff, International Law and Rules on International Jurisdiction, 50 Corn. L. Rev. 5, 12 (1964). 

[19] Id. 

[20] LSD.Law, Legal Definitions – Protective Principle (Oct. 2026), https://definitions.lsd.law/protective-principle.

[21] Erin Hale, China’s new ethnic unity law extends its legal reach overseas, Al Jazeera (July 2, 2026), https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/7/2/chinas-new-ethnic-unity-law-extends-its-legal-reach-overseas; EU and US concerned by China’s new ethnic unity law which targets people overseas, Reuters (July 2, 2026), https://www.reuters.com/world/china/eu-concerned-by-chinas-new-ethnic-unity-law-which-targets-people-overseas-2026-07-02/

[22] Resar, supra note 4, at 1841.

[23] Id at 1828; see also Ethnic Unity and Progress Law, supra note 2 (such provisions include those which state that all citizens have an “obligation to preserve national unity,” and all citizens “shall preserve the image of the Chinese people.”).

[24] Resar, supra note 4, at 1855.

[25] Lindsay Maizland, China’s Repression of Uyghurs in Xinjiang, Council on Foreign Rels. (Oct. 3, 2025, at 12:28 ET), https://www.cfr.org/backgrounders/china-xinjiang-uyghurs-muslims-repression-genocide-human-rights.

[26] Carl Minzer, China’s New Ethnic Unity Law: From Autonomy to Assimilation, Council on Foreign Rels. (Mar. 26, 2026, at 16:40 ET), https://www.cfr.org/articles/chinas-new-ethnic-unity-law-from-autonomy-to-assimilation.

[27] OHCHR, OL CHN 5/2026, (Apr. 16, 2026), https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=30922.

[28] Maizland, supra note 25.

[29] Minzer, supra note 26.

[30] Ethnic Unity and Progress Law, supra note 2.

[31] OHCHR, supra note 27.

[32] EU and US concerned by China’s new ethnic unity law which targets people overseas, supra note 21.

[33] OHCHR, supra note 27.

[34] Hale, supra note 21.

[35] Id. 

[36] Special Report 2021 China: Transnational Repression Origin Country Case Study, Freedom House, https://freedomhouse.org/report/transnational-repression/china (last visited Oct. 1, 2026).

[37] Siena Anstis, Noura Al-Jizawi & Ronald J. Deibert, Transnational Repression and the Different Faces of Sovereignty, 95 Temp. L. Rev. 641, 642 (2023).

[38] China: New ‘ethnic unity’ law set to entrench assimilation of minority groups, Amnesty Int’l (June 30, 2026), https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2026/06/china-new-ethnic-unity-law-set-to-entrench-assimilation-of-minority-groups/

[39] Id. 

[40] Id; Hoseein Amjadi, How Transnational Repression Tests European Democracies, Fair Observer, https://www.fairobserver.com/region/europe/how-transnational-repression-tests-european-democracies/ (last visited Oct. 1, 2026).

[41] Anstis, Al-Jizawi, & Deibert, supra note 37, at 643.

[42] Hale, supra note 21; EU and US concerned by China’s new ethnic unity law which targets people overseas, supra note 21.

[43] Cheng, supra note 5; Resar, supra note 4, at 1828.

[44] Cheng, supra note 5.

[45] Eyck Freymann, China’s Legal Warfare Against Taiwan: Allied contingency planning can’t wait, LawFare (Apr. 30, 2026), https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/china-s-legal-warfare-against-taiwan

[46] OHCHR, supra note 27; EU and US concerned by China’s new ethnic unity law which targets people overseas, supra note 21.

[47] Ethnic Unity and Progress Law, supra note 2.

[48] Id.

[49] Cheng, supra note 5.

[50] Cheng, supra note 5.

[51] Id. 

[52] EU and US concerned by China’s new ethnic unity law which targets people overseas, supra note 21.

[53] David Keane, China and Inter-State Communications under Article 11 of the International Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Dublin City Univ.  https://iicrr.ie/china-and-icerd/ (last visited Oct. 1, 2026). 

[54] Id. 

[55] Id.

[56] Margaret K. Lewis, Why China Should Unsign the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 53 Vand. J. Transnat’l. L 131, 138 (2020).

[57] Id. at 136.

[58] Margaret K. Lewis, China must stop making a mockery of the rights treaties it signs, Wash. Post (Oct. 30, 2018),  https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/global-opinions/wp/2018/10/30/china-must-stop-making-a-mockery-of-the-rights-treaties-it-signs/.

[59] Lewis, supra note 66, at 136.