Climate Migrants: Stretching the Meaning of “Refugee” under International Law

When their homes become uninhabitable, climate migrants have no legal protection under international law, but a UN ruling and an Australia-Tuvalu visa deal show that if the rules do not change, migrants might find a way to bend them.

The Republic of Kiribati, an archipelagic island nation.^[1]

While some steps have been taken in international law to provide a forum for discussing the global issue of climate change, one issue has notably been left unresolved: climate migrants. Where do people go when their homes become uninhabitable? Where should they go? Where are they able to go? These people are known as climate migrants, and they are proof that climate change is no longer a distant threat.[2] They have been forced to leave their homes due to drought, flooding, rising sea levels, and extreme temperatures, and the numbers are only growing.^[3]

The 1951 Refugee Convention, a United Nations multilateral treaty, defines a refugee as a person fleeing persecution “for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion.”^[4] However, the Convention leaves out the category of climate migrants. There are no other international treaties that recognize or protect climate migrants, meaning there are no protections for this class of migrants under international law. At the time, climate change was not a pressing issue for the convention authors, but few countries have adopted protections for climate migrants even under domestic law.^[5] 

Refugee Status

Due to the reluctance of international law to recognize climate migrants and grant them special protections, some scholars have been asking if climate migrants can be classified under the current refugee definition.[6] By taking a broad reading to the 1951 Refugee Convention, climate migrants, especially those facing the most severe climate conditions, may be able to make a legal argument for refugee status.[7]

Climate change is a threat multiplier, meaning that it worsens existing social, economic, and political instabilities.[8] This instability is key for climate migrants making the argument that they face the persecution necessary to gain refugee status.[9] Climate change and disasters may limit access to land and natural resources, which may threaten the enjoyment of the right to life; physical integrity; an adequate standard of living; health, water and sanitation; and self-determination and development.[10] 

Climate change can also exacerbate violence, and deteriorating infrastructure may render the State incapable of protecting the victims of such violence, resulting in a well-founded fear of persecution.[11] If the State is unable to ensure access to food and clean water, livelihoods for populations that rely on natural resources are at risk.[12] The risk of human rights violations amounting to persecution is very real where there is food insecurity.[13] Droughts and crop failures force populations to move to urban areas within their country, which often leads to social unrest and competition over resources.[14]

Putting Theory into Practice

The UN Human Rights Committee's decision in Ioane Teitiota v. New Zealand (adopted in 2019) held that countries may violate international human rights law if they deport individuals to nations where climate change or environmental degradation exposes them to life-threatening risks.[15] Plaintiff Ioane Teitiota claimed that New Zealand violated his right to life by removing him to his home country of Kiribati after his application for refugee status was rejected.[16] Teitiota argued that the effects of climate change and sea level rise forced him to migrate from Kiribati to New Zealand.[17] The situation in Kiribati has become increasingly unstable as fresh water has become scarce due to saltwater contamination and housing has decreased as inhabitable land has eroded.[18] According to Teitioa, Kiribati was no longer safe for his family due to lack of resources: food; water; shelter; transportation; and access to healthcare.[19] The UN Human Rights Committee decided that New Zealand did not violate Teitiota’s rights by removing him to Kiribati because he did not face an imminent risk of persecution as defined by the 1951 Refugee Convention.[20] There was no evidence that he faced a real chance of suffering serious physical harm from violence in the future.[21] For these reasons, he was not a “refugee” as defined by the Refugee Convention.

Despite what appears to be a setback in the battle for greater protections, the UN Human Rights Committee left the door open for future climate-related refugee claims.[22] Climate-related threats could theoretically qualify as a reason to prevent deportation to a country.[23] More recently, the 2023 Australia-Tuvalu Falepili Union created the world's first operational climate-specific bilateral visa pathway, allowing up to 280 Tuvaluans annually to move to Australia.[24] Tuvalu is one of the most vulnerable states to sea-level rise.[25] This visa allows Tuvaluans to migrate to Australia under a new visa allowing them to work, study, and live in the country, but not as refugees.[26] However, it is the first treaty to provide a pathway for mobility as climate change effects in a country worsen, marking an evolution in international climate law.

Pushing Forward

Our international refugee system is taking small steps towards encompassing those facing severe climate risks.[27] However, as the climate threat multiplies, it may not be enough to simply broaden the reading of the 1951 Convention.[28] Climate change can lead to violence that creates persecution per the convention, but climate change itself destroys lives and homes just like war does.[29] Of course, many nations will be against expanding the definition of a refugee, but they will soon be forced to address this human rights question.

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^[1] Brian Reed, Photograph of The I-Kiribati Village of Tebunginako, in Brian Reed, Climate Change And Faith Collide in Kiribati, NPR (Feb. 16, 2011, at 00:01 ET), https://www.npr.org/2011/02/16/133650679/climate-change-and-faith-collide-in-kiribati.

[2] See generally U.N. High Comm'r for Refugees, No Escape II: The Way Forward: Bringing Climate Solutions to the Frontlines of Conflict and Displacement (Nov. 2025), https://www.unhcr.org/media/no-escape-ii-way-forward.

^[3] Id. at 3, 19.

^[4] Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees art. 1(A)(2), July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137.

^[5] Julian Hattem, "Climate Refugees" Do Not Exist as a Concept—But Countries Are Testing New Approaches to Offer Protection, Migration Info. Source (Mar. 19, 2026), https://www.migrationpolicy.org/journal/feature/climate-refugees-do-not-exist-concept-countries-are-testing-new-approaches-offer.

[6] See U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Legal Considerations Regarding Claims for International Protections Made in the Context of the Adverse Effects of Climate Change and Disasters ¶¶ 6–12 (Oct. 1, 2020) [hereinafter Legal Considerations], https://www.refworld.org/policy/legalguidance/unhcr/2020/123356.

[7] See id.

[8] Julio Torales et al., Climate Change as a Threat Multiplier: Conflict Pathways, Inequities, and Mental Health Impacts, 38 Int’l Rev. Psychiatry 576 (Jan. 28, 2026), https://doi.org/10.1080/09540261.2026.2620547.

[9] See Legal Considerations, supra note 7, at ¶¶ 7–9. 

[10]Id.

[11] Id.

[12] Id.

[13] Id.

[14] Id. 

[15] Ioane Teitiota v. New Zealand, Hum. Rts. Comm., Commc'n No. 2728/2016, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/127/D/2728/2016, ¶¶ 8.5–8.6 (Jan. 7, 2020), https://www.refworld.org/jurisprudence/caselaw/hrc/2020/123128.

[16] Id.

[17] Id.

[18] Id. ¶ 2.1.

[19] Id.

[20] Id. ¶ 10.

[21] Id. ¶¶ 2.8, 4.6.

[22] See id. ¶¶ 2.8.

[23] See id. ¶¶ 2.8.

[24] Hattem, supra note 6.

[25] Id.

[26] Id. 

[27] See id.

[28] See id.

[29] See id.