Extrajudicial Killings in the Caribbean: Dubious Legality for U.S. Boat Strikes

The legality of U.S. missile strikes against alleged drug traffickers in South American waters has come under scrutiny from both domestic and international observers due to its apparent conflict with longstanding norms regarding a state's treatment of individuals.

via Donald Trump/Truth Social (Sept. 2, 2025, at 5:22 PM)

A signature aspect of the second Trump administration’s foreign policy has been unilateral missile strikes on suspected drug traffickers in the Western hemisphere. The legal authority for these actions, however, is dubious. As the scope of the administration’s Caribbean campaign has widened, domestic and international observers have raised concerns that the strikes violate core tenets of international law.

Caribbean Attacks

Beginning in September 2025, the Trump administration initiated a deadly campaign against suspected “narco-terrorists” in South American waters.^[1] This campaign, dubbed “Operation Southern Spear” by the Department of Defense, has resulted in the destruction of at least 37 boats and 117 passenger fatalities as of January 2026.^[2]

Recent reporting on the first strike of this campaign has invited renewed commentary regarding the legality of these attacks.^[3] On September 2, a strike against a Venezuelan ship resulted in the deaths of all 11 individuals on board.^[4] The U.S. claimed that the decedents were members of Tren de Aragua, a Venezuelan gang designated as a terrorist group by the U.S. since February 2025.^[5] Months after the initial salvo, a Washington Post report said that this attack actually consisted of two strikes.^[6] The first was meant to eliminate the boat, but Pentagon officials reportedly realized minutes after the strike that there were two survivors clinging to the wreckage.^[7] In accordance with Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth’s orders to “kill them all,” operators under the command of Admiral Mitch Bradley launched a second strike.^[8]

While White House and Pentagon officials initially denied the entire report, they have since acknowledged that there was a second strike but now maintain it was entirely legal.^[9] Hegseth and Bradley have both steadfastly denied that there was any order to kill survivors.^[10] In a December 2025 briefing, Bradley showed a video of the second strike to lawmakers, though this footage has not been released publicly.^[11] Republican and Democratic lawmakers in the briefing have differed in their characterizations of the report—some claimed that the survivors were attempting to flip the boat and continue their mission, while others stated they were simply trying to reach safety—but both sides acknowledge that there was a second strike.^[12]

Authority for Missile Strikes

The U.S. Constitution specifically grants the power to declare war to Congress.^[13] Though Congressional war power was often invoked for early American conflicts, such as the War of 1812, modern presidents have often acted without explicit congressional approval.^[14] The 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) provided the basis for much of the contemporary executive’s authority to act without congressional approval.^[15] The text of this legislation is sufficiently broad that subsequent administrations have used it to justify.^[16]

The administration has further claimed that the collective self-defense of the U.S. and its regional allies is a legitimate justification for the strikes.^[17] A November 2025 memo from the Department of Justice’s Office of Legal Counsel argued that the vessels are part of a coordinated network by Tren de Aragua to launch armed attacks against the U.S. and its allies.^[18] Though the memo did not provide any evidence, it uses a self-defense claim to demonstrate that an armed conflict exists, allowing the executive to use lethal force that would otherwise violate international law.^[19]

The Law of War and International Humanitarian Law

In interpreting legality of war, the U.S. is subject to both domestic and international laws. States, including the US, are governed both by formal agreements and customary practices in international law.^[20] International humanitarian law (IHL), a subfield of public international law, is meant to prevent armed conflict and regulate the conduct of those who do enter states of war.^[21] Above all, IHL seeks to promote the preservation of human life in conflict.^[22]

In law enforcement operations, force is prohibited against suspected lawbreakers unless it is absolutely necessary to prevent loss of life.^[23] Multiple authorities, including the Office of the UN High Commissioner on Human Rights, have specifically held that the U.S. strikes on civilian boats were extrajudicial killings regardless of the criminal status of the alleged combatants on board.^[24] While drug trafficking can lead to loss of life if unimpeded, there were other options in this case to combat the spread of narcotics—such as arresting the alleged traffickers or intercepting the cargo on land—that would not have resulted in loss of life.^[25]

Building on the framework of the Geneva and Hague Conventions, the International Committee of the Red Cross set out guidelines regarding the treatment of enemy combatants, specifically prohibiting harming a defenseless enemy or issuing orders “that there shall be no survivors…and to conduct hostilities on such basis.”^[26]

Conclusion

Given the facts surrounding these boat strikes, the Administration’s claims that the boat strikes were part of an ongoing armed conflict are implausible. The Administration has offered no evidence that the U.S. is actually in an armed conflict with Tren de Aragua or any other drug trafficking organization. Moreover, there is no evidence that there was an imminent threat to the US. Given the other options the Pentagon had of containing the threat, such as arresting the alleged drug traffickers rather than destroying their vessels, this campaign can be more accurately categorized as a law enforcement operation.

Amidst denials by the Administration, murky details as to the chain of command, and emerging evidence, the exact story of the September 2 strikes is unclear. However, if the reporting is correct—that the Pentagon ordered a second strike on two survivors of the initial attack with no evidence that these survivors were in any position to continue their alleged mission—then this act would likely be a violation of IHL. Ancillary details—such as whether it was Secretary Hegseth or Admiral Bradley who commanded the second strike, or whether there was an explicit or implicit order to “kill them all”—do not change this analysis.

In light of startling recent developments in the region, public attention has understandably shifted away from the missilestrikes. But even so, the conduct of the U.S. in less-publicized areas in international affairs should still be a high domestic priority. The ability to use force is arguably the most solemn responsibility of the federal government. In an era of increased global instability, the tenets of IHL provide protection to civilians regardless of status or nationality. Nonadherence to these principles, even in pursuit of valid law enforcement operations, threatens this protection.

The available evidence indicates that this campaign resulted in extrajudicial killings. Given the domestic political realities, it is difficult to imagine immediate accountability for the officials who issued and carried out these orders. Nevertheless, there should still be robust public hearings and investigations, now or in the future, by Congressional and international authorities to ascertain the full fact pattern of these strikes and determine the appropriate sanctions for wrongdoers.

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^[1] Michael Rios, Avery Schmitz, & Matt Stiles, A Timeline of US strikes on boats that have killed 117, CNN (Jan. 23, 2026), https://www.cnn.com/2025/11/02/politics/timeline-us-strikes-caribbean-pacific-vis.

^[2] Id.

^[3] Alex Horton & Ellen Nakashima, Hegseth Order on First Caribbean Boat Strike, Officials Say: Kill Them All, Washington Post (Nov. 28, 2025), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2025/11/28/hegseth-kill-them-all-survivors-boat-strike/

^[4] Rios, supra note 2.

^[5] Id.

^[6] Horton, supra note 3.

^[7] Id.

^[8] Id.

^[9] Cai Pigliucci, James FitzGerald & Brandon Drenon, Admiral Testified Hegseth Did Not Give ‘Kill Them All’ Order, US Lawmakers Say, BBC(Dec. 4, 2025) https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cwyxjd6pxzro.

^[10] Id.

^[11] Hugo Lowell, US Justice Department Memo About Boat Strikes Diverges from Trump Narrative, The Guardian (Nov. 25, 2025), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2025/nov/25/trump-caribbean-boat-strikes-memo.

^[12] Pigliucci, supra note 9

^[13] U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.

^[14] Elizabeth Goitein, Congress’s Role in Military Conflict: The Growing Gap Between Constitutional Principle and Practice, Brennan Ctr. (Jan. 15, 2020), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/congresss-role-military-conflict-growing-gap-between-constitutional.

^[15] The Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) was a generally open-ended law passed by Congress after 9/11 to allow the President to use “necessary and appropriate force” to combat terrorism, but has continued to be used to justify some of the largest military operations in the decades since. See How a Single Phrase Defined the War on Terror, Council on Foreign Relations (Sept. 11, 2025) https://education.cfr.org/learn/reading/how-single-phrase-defined-war-terror.

^[16] See id.

^[17] Lowell, supra note 11.

^[18] Id.

^[19] Id.

^[20] International Law and Agreements: Their Effect upon U.S. Law, Congress.gov (July 13, 2023) https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/RL32528#fn1.

^[21] What Is International Law?, Council on Foreign Relations (July 25, 2023), https://education.cfr.org/learn/reading/what-international-law.

^[22] International Humanitarian Law Overview, N.E. Univ. Sch. of L. Ctr.  for Global L. and Just., https://cglj.org/international-humanitarian-law/ (last visited Feb. 09, 2026).

^[23] US Strikes in Caribbean and Pacific Breach International Law, says UN Rights Chief, U.N. (Oct. 31, 2025) https://news.un.org/en/story/2025/10/1166234.

^[24] Id.

^[25] See id.

^[26] Dorota M. Banaszewska, Hors De Combat, Oxford Pub. Int’l L. (Nov. 2015), https://opil.ouplaw.com/display/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e2170?d=%2F10.1093%2Flaw%3Aepil%2F9780199231690%2Flaw-9780199231690-e2170&p=emailAoAIpXMzqpgio&print.